This paper examines how success-at-work, interpreted by both subjective and relative criteria, can motivate individuals to enhance their effort and utility. We employ a general specification utility function and show that the final effect of technological growth on individuals' effort and utility depends, respectively, on the assumptions we make about their nature with regard to their effort strategies (i.e.
Introduction
In conventional economic theory, a household's' utility is usually measured in terms of absolute level of income (largely consumption), whereas work and effort generate disutility. Although, there is a positive relationship between absolute levels of income and happiness, a number of recent papers, supported by surveys, suggest that an individual's subjective utility is more closely related to relative rather than absolute income, (Easterlin 1995 , Solnick and Hemenway 1998 , Alpizar, Carlsson, JohanssonStenman 2005 . Yet, there is a large literature that questions the extent to which, in relative terms higher income increases utility (i.e. Easterlin 1974 , Frank 1985 , Oswald, 1997 , Easterlin 2001 , Frey and Stutzer 2001 , 2002 , Stutzer, 2004 ; or whether people are becoming happier over time as economic growth increases (Blanchflower and Oswald 2000, Easterlin, 1995) .
More interestingly, statistical evidence in industrialized countries appears to question whether work generates disutility. In general, evidence supports three findings relating to utility from work, (a) unemployed people are less happy than employed people (Clark, and Oswald 1994 , Oswald 1997 , Di Tella , MacCulloch, and Oswald, 2001 ); (b) white-collar workers are relatively happier than manual workers; (c) most people asked in surveys say that they would keep working even if they had sufficient income or won a lottery. Findings (a) and (b) may at first glance look consistent with the standard economic theory; the former for example, may be explained because of lack of income, whereas the latter because of the implied differences in income. However (c) suggests that work itself derives some source of 'joy' that is not substitutable for income. This also questions whether findings (a) and (b) are purely income related. Psychologists for example find that unemployment makes people unhappy even when they control for differences in income and that large increases in peoples' incomes cannot adequately compensate them for remaining without a job. Frey and Stutzer (2001) , for example, show that subjective happiness does depend on absolute and relative income but only up to a point, above which increases in average income per head contribute little to well being. Alpizar, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2005) , find that although both absolute and relative income and consumption matter to individuals, people may care for certain goods that are not seen traditionally as 'positional' goods. 1 The above findings tend to suggest two further misconceptions in the so-called representative utility function. First, that even in relative terms higher income does not necessary imply higher utility and second that work is not only a source of disutility, as traditionally assumed in conventional economic theory. The former of these effects, has already attracted some attention, but whether people work also because of personal satisfaction, rather than pure rivalry or "envy" among their colleagues, is a question that has received much less attention.
In general, as pointed out by Hirsch (1976) , when utility depends on relative (rather than absolute) income, competition becomes "positional". Positional concerns imply that agents compare themselves with a reference level of income, consumption, or effort. We can generalise this literature by assuming the following utility form,
Where α represents an individual's own variable (usually income, consumption, or effort) and A is a reference level of that variable. The bulk of the literature then assumes that, Clark and Oswald 1998 , Gali 1994 , Al-Nowaihi and Stracca 2005 . The latter effect implies that there is a complementarity between α and A, which by assumption implies that agents prefer relative to absolute levels of income, consumption or effort. This, combined with the assumption, 0 V u > , as usually assumed by the literature, implies that individual effort is mainly driven by rivalry or 'envy'. 2 Perhaps a more important implication of the above assumptions is that 'status' in most studies becomes synonymous with 'relative income'. So for example, a scientist or an academic would have a lower 'status' and be less happy than, say a broker or a plumper, if the latter two earn 1 In their study these non-positional goods included vacation and insurance. 2 In Clark et al (1998) , this comparison to the reference level is modelled directly as V(α-A ) or V(α/A *); hence, V′(.)>0 and V′′ (.)<0 implies that agents are envious. more relative income. Similarly, the theory would imply that a teacher or an artist would happily exchange their professions with either a dentist or a banker if the latter two earned more relative income than the former two.
In this paper we attempt to re-examine some of the above effects by employing a general utility specification that assumes away some of the restrictive assumption in the literature. We allow the model to capture a number of observations that are also supported by surveys. First, individuals, derive utility from both absolute and relative income. Second, work but also success at work may be a source of joy for many individuals, rather than just a source of disutility. Third, 'status' and 'relative income' are not synonymous in this model. For each individual, success-at-work depends on both a subjective evaluation of personal success (i.e. how individuals rate their personal satisfaction from their nature of their job, regardless of income or consumption) but also on a relative or objective evaluation of success-at-work (i.e. in relation to the success of others within the same professional group). It is the latter of these, -i.e. relative success -that is closer to the definition of 'status' in the literature. Yet, although effort of individuals may be driven by relative success-at-work the latter is not necessarily synonymous to relative income, as 'effort', 'success' and 'consumption' are not identical concepts in this model. Finally, we relax the widely used assumption of an exogenously given reference standard. In this paper the reference level of success is given as the aggregation of all agents' individual levels of success. So without imposing the assumption that an individual's success level increases only in relation to some exogenous reference level of success, our definition of the latter allows higher levels of effort and success by some individuals to endogenously raise the success standards. This however does not make any presumption about each individual's behaviour. Our utility is such that does not explicitly impose convexity or concavity assumptions, and so it allows for many different combinations:
i.e. altruistic-conformists, altruistic-deviants, envious-conformist and envious-deviants.
A Success-at-Work Augmented Utility Model
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents uniformly distributed on [0, 1] , and are indexed by
. In addition to consumption and effort each type of agents derives satisfaction from their degree of success-at-work. Agents are identical in all respects except their degree of success-consciousness. Without loss of generality, we assume that agents are ranked by their degree of success-consciousness, such that agent i is characterised by a specific value of ( ) i φ , where However, the latter does not describe the behaviour of all individuals, as we do not impose conditions of conformity and envy in this model. As we show in section 2.1, depending on the shape of the ( )
.,. V function, agents may have tendency either to conform to, or deviate from the average success level. 4 The bulk of the literature assumes that reference standards are exogenously determined. For some recent papers that examine the effects of endogenising reference standards see Falk and Knell (2004) and Al-Nowaihi and Stracca (2005) . 5 Note that is with most of this literature we assume a constant marginal disutility of effort, which is excludes excessive levels of effort (see In theory, it would also be possible to allow the utility of consumption, as well as disutility of effort, to be dependent on relative terms. However, to simplify the analysis, in this model we assume that effort as well as consumption of each agent are much less observable to other agents than success is, such that only the utility of success is dependent on a reference level. (2) is,
A Nash Equilibrium
Where the population is large, the effect of each agent's action on the average level of success is negligible, as the value of i de s d tends to zero. 7 Consequently, the equation above becomes
Assuming that the second order condition 11
( )
7 With social interaction taking place between many individuals, where the influence of each individual on the social outcome is very small, the Nash equilibrium is analytically equivalent to a competitive equilibrium were agents takes the value of s as given. In the Appendix, we extend our analysis to allow for interactions in smaller groups, where individuals have positive weights. It will be shown that, with appropriate changes to notations, allowing individuals to have positive weights does not affect any results in this paper.
From equation (4) 
This proposition states that the higher is a households subjective preference for utility from success (as determined by ( ) j φ ) the higher will be the level of effort that this household chooses to devote to work, in relation to that implied by a cooperative equilibrium where all effort is directed towards output production and consumption. Higher effort therefore may be the outcome of personal satisfaction (i.e. subjective success-at-work) even if individuals, as we show below, do not conform to competing for relative success-at-work (i.e. status). Yet subconsciously, the higher effort from personal satisfaction at work will also result in higher level of consumption. 
Corollary 2: Within a Nash equilibrium, agents with higher degree of success-consciousness, exert higher effort and as a result have a higher level of success at work and a greater level of consumption.

Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 2, according to which, the value of
In principle, an increase in the degree of success-consciousness has two channels through which it affects the level of utility. First, individuals choose their optimal effort level and second, individuals give different weights to success in terms of utility. As in the envelope theorem, in an optimizing environment the first channel of effect is negligible and therefore the total effect is entirely dependent on the second channel. Thus, since here the second channel is positive, individuals with a higher degree of success-consciousness obtain a higher level of utility.
It is possible to interpret our model as a one of work ethics, 10 with work ethics being represented by the value of s . With this interpretation, the level of work ethics affects the decision of effort supply by each individual in the economy; on the other hand, the particular level of work ethics is itself endogenous determined, depending on both the level of technology as well as the effort supply of all agents.
Interestingly, none of the results obtained in this section are dependent on the competition strategies or preference characterization of agents, and so whether they are conformist/deviants, or altruistic/envious. For any combination of these possible characteristics, the existence of successconsciousness enhances effort level, consumption, and utility in the Nash equilibrium. In the next section however, we show that how productivity growth affects effort and utility does depend on social interaction and competition for relative success and hence whether individuals are conformists/deviants, or altruistic/envious.
Effects of Productivity Growth on Effort and Utility
Exogenous Productivity Growth
In this section we consider the effects of an exogenous increase in the level of productivity. Analysis in the previous section may give the impression that, exogenous rises in the value of A would unambiguously increase the effort level of all individuals. This, however, is not the case in general.
Changes in productivity (A) typically affect the reference success level, ( ) i s s , as they raise all individuals' success levels, ( , ) i i s e A . However, as higher productivity raises the success standards, individuals are not by assumption conform to rivalry in this model. They may choose to be 'envy' motivated as in other models and amplify their effort, but they may also choose to retain the same level of effort as before or even reduce the level of effort as they become discouraged by the rising standards. At this stage, to obtain clear results we need to impose additional restrictions on the utility function.
We substitute the optimal choice of effort in (4) into the first order condition (3), and take the total derivative with respect to 
is the effect of productivity growth on the marginal benefit of effort in securing success.
The term 12 v could be positive, zero, or negative, depending on whether agents are conformists, neutrals or deviants.
To analyse the value of dA s d
at the neighbourhood of a Nash equilibrium, we use equation (5) to define the function,
Based on equation (7), the reference success level in a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as the fixed point that satisfies,
. Figure 1 
is satisfied locally, then for any small perturbation to the value of s around the equilibrium level, the economy will return to the original equilibrium. In Figure 1, As Lemma 1 holds, it follows that,
, which implies that the average success level increases directly as the result of the common productivity. The final effect however, that a change in productivity has on the on the effort chosen by individuals, is ambiguous and will be determined crucially on whether agents are conformists, neutrals or deviants. When people are conformists an increase in productivity will increase all individual agents' efforts. In this model, this is because a higher productivity raises the average level of success. Conformists will always want to adjust their own success level in relation to that of the average success ( s ) and so they will increase their effort following an increase in productivity which raises average success. This effect is similar to the 'rat race' effect, because by providing a higher individual effort, conformists push the average level of success to a higher Nash equilibrium (i.e. here endogenously through the effect that a higher A has on i e ). This result however only holds when all agents are conformists.
Interestingly, in the case of neutrals, ( 12 0 v = ), / 0 i de dA > , hence higher productivity increases effort even when individuals do not seek to further enhance their success as a response to higher standards. This is because of the effects productivity growth has on both the marginal benefit of effort in obtaining the consumption good, which is always positive ( 12 u >0), but also through the element of personal satisfaction at work, which is 0
indicates that given a higher productivity, individuals may intensify their effort out of personal satisfaction from work, even when they do not wish to conform to competition for relative success
If individuals are deviants ( 12 0 v < ), the final effect depends on the size of the effects, How effort levels react to technological growth is independent of whether agents are altruistic or envious. However, these characteristics can determine the way agents' utility levels are affected by growth. Substituting the optimal effort level in (4) into the utility function in (2), and taking the total derivative, gives (8 Intuitively, an increase in productivity will have a twofold effect, (i) it increases the marginal product of effort in producing consumption goods and so it increases,
U c e A , which is the conventional part of the utility function; (ii) it increases the average level of success ( s ) pushing all agents' status to a higher level and this also increases utility, through ( and hence on the effect that the raised reference success s (due to an overall higher productivity) has on the individual levels of efforts towards individual success. It follows that when the utility function is characterized by 'envy', individuals may exhibit very different attitudes toward technological growth.
However, if the utility function is characterized by 'altruism', all agents benefit from technological growth.
To sum up, the way effort levels respond to technological growth is dependent on whether agents are conformist, neutrals, or deviants. On the other hand, how levels of utility are affected by growth is dependent on whether agents are envious or altruistic. As these two aspects are independent of each other, effort and utility can respond to technological growth in any direction. For example, for envious-conformists, productivity growth may lead to both effort increase and utility reduction; for altruistic-deviants, growth can lead to effort reduction and utility growth; while altruisticconformists expend more effort and obtain higher utility as the result of growth.
Endogenous Productivity Growth
The results obtained in the previous section can be easily extended to allow for endogenous productivity growth. Previous studies on the joint determination of economic growth and social interaction include Cole, et al. (1992) and Fershtman et al. (1996) . Of these two papers, Cole et al. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper suggests that success-at-work, interpreted by both subjective and relative criteria, may motivate individuals to enhance their effort and utility. To examine this, we use a general specification utility function, which does not predetermine that people' efforts our motivated by rivalry, i.e. towards a higher status. In this model, an increase in productivity growth raises the reference level of success.
This places pressure on people to intensify their individual level of effort, but whether individuals conform to this pressure is determined by each individual's characteristics. In general we show that conformists will intensify their effort as they are motivated by both subjective and relative criteria of success-at-work. Neutrals do not care about rivalry but they too intensify their efforts because of personal success-consciousness at work (subjective criteria). For deviants however the effect is ambiguous and may even result in individuals lowering their effort discouraged by the potential 'ratrace' effect that follows. Moreover, we show that when agents are altruistic, growth always enhances utility, whereas if agents are envious, technological growth may end up reducing utility.
Given this, the model can explain a number of combinational effects on effort, growth, and utility, all of which can be plausible depending on the nature of individuals and particularly on the degree of their personal success-consciousness at-work as well as their competition strategies towards relative success and status.
Appendix: Individuals with Positive Weights
In this appendix, we show that it is entirely possible to modifying the model by allowing the number of individuals in the ecnomy to be small, without affecting the results of analysis.
In particular, assume the economy is populated by n individuals, indexed by . ,... . In a Nash equilibrium, each player takes the value of i s − as being given. 
